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Introduction 
European economic governance aims to 
support the functioning of the EU by 
ensuring that national fiscal and economic 
policies are sound. The persisting eurozone 
debt crisis has shown that the rules in place 
were insufficient. Making economic 
governance effective has therefore become a 
key goal of EU policymakers. 
A major weakness of European economic 
governance lies in its inability to ensure 
compliance by the Member States. As a 
response to this problem, a reform of the 
economic governance rules will introduce 
new sanctions1. Policymakers doubt however 
whether these sanctions will be sufficient. 
In order to complement the sanction 
‘toolbox’, the Commission proposes to make 
parts of the EU’s expenditure conditional on 
respecting the EU economic governance 
rules. As cohesion policy is a major EU 
expenditure, it is a prime candidate for such 
conditionality. 
Another important point of discussion is the 
difficulty some Member States have in 
taking-up the cohesion funding they are 
entitled to, as they lack the financial means to 
the co-finance cohesion policy projects. 
Therefore, facilitating some countries’ access 
to cohesion policy funds is also taken into 
consideration. 
The idea of linking cohesion policy 
to EU economic governance has 
received the support of several EU 
institutions. The nature of such 
link is still to be agreed upon and is 
likely to lead to intense 
discussions. This Policy Brief 
argues that while the Commission’s 
envisaged proposal has its merits, it 
would nevertheless result in a 
partial and inconsistent link 
between the cohesion policy and 
EU economic governance. A more 
flexible and coherent approach is 
proposed. 
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Changes to the cohesion policy would be 
adopted as part of the EU 2014-2020 
financial framework, even if some elements 
could possibly be introduced earlier on.  The 
idea to link cohesion policy to EU economic 
governance has also gained traction in the 
Commission, the Council and the European 
Central Bank2. Importantly, French President 
Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel 
support the idea as well3. The Parliament for 
its part is still divided on the issue.  
Given the importance of cohesion policy, it is 
clear that the reform will be highly 
controversial. Each year, the EU spends 
approximately EUR 50 billion on its 
cohesion policy4. Cohesion funding is used 
mainly, though not exclusively, to provide 
grants to projects that aim to reduce 
disparities in the levels of development of the 
various regions5. The assistance is provided 
by means of three funds. The Cohesion Fund 
allocates about 20% of the cohesion budget 
to the least prosperous Member States. The 
remaining 80% is allocated on a regional 
basis by two other funds, which together are 
known as the Structural Funds6. 
This brief assesses the proposed linking of 
cohesion policy to European economic 
governance. First, the rationale for linking the 
two policies is considered (§1). Such a linkage 
is already in place to some extent, as is 
described afterwards (§2). Subsequently, the 
paper outlines the Commission’s proposal 
(§3) and discusses its shortcomings (§4). 
Finally, an alternative approach is put 
forward (§5). 
1. The rationale behind the idea 
The prime reason for linking cohesion policy 
to EU economic governance is to improve 
the enforceability of the economic 
governance rules. Making cohesion funding 
conditional on abiding by these rules would 
have two advantages over other foreseen 
sanctions. Most importantly, the sanction 
would in theory be easier to put into practice. 
Other sanctions entail a financial transfer 
from a Member State to the EU. This would 
not be the case for sanctions based on 
cohesion policy, as they imply withholding 
EU funding. The sanction thus does not 
result in a direct deterioration of the Member 
State’s budget. As a second advantage, each 
of the 27 Member States could be concerned 
by the sanction. The other meaningful 
sanctions only concern the eurozone 
countries. 
The Commission stresses that linking 
cohesion policy to economic governance is 
also beneficial for cohesion policy itself. The 
recent crises have shown that fiscal and 
macro-economic imbalances can limit the 
usefulness of cohesion policy. On the one 
hand, substantial parts of cohesion funding 
were not taken up by troubled Member 
States, as they were simply unable to provide 
the co-financing necessary. On the other 
hand, fiscal and economic imbalances can 
stand in the way of long-term economic 
growth and thus limit the usefulness of 
cohesion funding. Closer attention to the 
economic governance rules could prevent 
some of these difficulties.  
2. The current link 
Under the EU 2007-2013 financial 
framework, cohesion policy is to a minor 
extent conditional on abiding by the rules of 
economic governance. This conditionality 
only applies to the Cohesion Fund, not to the 
Structural Funds. Furthermore, the use of the 
Cohesion Fund has only been made 
dependent on a country’s fiscal performance, 
not on macro-economic criteria. 
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According to the rules, a Member State’s 
cohesion funds can be suspended if it fails to 
take the necessary corrective actions when 
under an Excessive Deficit Procedure7. Such 
a decision should be made by a qualified 
majority in the Council and on a proposal by 
the Commission. Both the Commission and 
the Council enjoy a large level of discretion, 
as they are in no way obliged to take 
measures. A suspension can be reversed once 
the Council rules that the Member State has 
taken sufficient corrective action. In that 
case, the suspended cohesion funds would 
again be available to the Member State. An 
annulment of the funds is not foreseen8. 
Based on this procedure, funding for Greece 
could have been suspended in 20109. 
However, this did not take place, as it was 
not proposed by the Commission. The 
Council for its part did not request a 
proposal from the Commission. It was not 
considered appropriate to take such 
measures. 
3. Outline of the Commission proposal 
In a number of publications, the Commission 
has put forward the main elements of its plan 
to link cohesion policy to European 
economic governance. Detailed legislative 
proposals will be published during the course 
of 201110.   
The Commission proposes a twofold link 
between cohesion policy and economic 
governance. Firstly, the Commission suggests 
expanding the use of cohesion policy as a 
way of sanctioning violations of the EU 
economic governance rules.  Secondly, the 
Commission seeks to put in place rules that 
allow easier access to cohesion funds for 
countries that receive emergency EU 
financial assistance11.  
With regard to the latter, the Commission 
proposes easing co-financing requirements. 
This would be possible for both eurozone 
and non-eurozone countries that require 
emergency financial assistance by the EU12. 
In August 2011, the Commission already 
proposed less stringent co-financing 
requirements for the countries having 
received EU financial assistance in the recent 
past, i.e. three eurozone countries (Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal), as well as three non-
eurozone countries (Hungary, Latvia and 
Romania)13. By changing the relevant 
legislation, it would be possible to ease co-
financing requirements for all countries that 
request EU financial assistance in the future.  
Regarding the use of cohesion policy as a 
means of sanctioning Member States, the 
Commission envisages several changes to the 
current rules. As a first modification, the 
Commission proposes making all cohesion 
policy funds conditional on abiding by the 
economic governance rules14. This implies 
expanding the current conditionality, so that 
it covers both the Cohesion Fund, as well as 
the two Structural Funds. 
Secondly, the Commission seeks to introduce 
a more gradual sanctioning mechanism. This 
would replace the current approach, where 
the suspension of cohesion funding is only 
foreseen at the final stage of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. A partial suspension could 
be introduced first, before stepping-up the 
sanctions. This gradual approach would be 
similar to the sanctions foreseen in the 
economic governance reform. 
While initial sanctions would be modest in 
nature, the final sanction in cases of non-
compliance would become more severe than 
what is currently foreseen. Ultimately, a 
Member State could be denied access to the 
cohesion funding. 
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Additionally, the Commission proposes 
reducing the scope for political bargaining 
when applying a sanction. This implies 
introducing a so-called reversed qualified 
majority voting procedure. This voting 
procedure would make it more difficult for 
the Council to block a sanction and would 
therefore increase the clout of the 
Commission15. 
In its proposals the Commission focuses on 
linking cohesion policy to the economic 
governance’s fiscal rules. Macro-economic 
governance could be included to some extent 
by making cohesion policy dependent on 
structural reform. Yet, a direct link to the 
macro-economic governance rules is not 
envisaged. 
4. The shortcomings of the proposal 
The idea of linking cohesion policy to 
economic governance rules has provoked 
mixed reactions16. Indeed, while the idea has 
its merits (see §1), it is also subject to several 
drawbacks. Four problems are worth noting. 
As a first problem, limiting cohesion policy 
funding can be seen as an improperly 
targeted sanction. Structural Funds are 
allocated on a regional basis, while central 
governments carry most of the responsibili-
ties for respecting economic governance 
rules. Expanding economic governance 
conditionality to the Structural Funds could 
therefore sanction the regions for matters 
that are outside of their scope of compe-
tence17. Furthermore, cohesion policy funds 
are largely aimed at the less-prosperous 
Member States. These countries would thus 
be the prime targets of the proposed 
conditionality. This can be seen as unjust18. 
A second problem concerns the 
counterproductive nature of financial 
sanctions. When a country breaches the 
economic governance rules, its public 
finances are likely to be in poor shape. By 
reducing the country’s cohesion funding, the 
Member State would be left with two 
options. On the one hand, the Member State 
could decide to finance the project itself. In 
that case, the Member States’ budget deficit 
would increase further. Alternatively, projects 
could not be carried out, which would impair 
economic growth. In both instances, the 
sanction therefore aggravates the Member 
States’ difficulties. 
Thirdly, the Commission’s proposal focuses 
heavily on making cohesion policy 
conditional on the fiscal side of the economic 
governance rules. Little attention is given to 
rules pertaining to macro-economic and 
competitiveness issues. The problems in 
Ireland and Spain have shown that macro-
economic evolutions can undermine the 
functioning of the EU and the monetary 
union. Furthermore, macro-economic 
derailments can also be detrimental to the 
effectiveness of cohesion funding. 
Last but not least, when considered in their 
entirety the Commission’s plans seem 
inconsistent. Under the Commission’s 
proposal, a Member State that breaches the 
economic governance rules would see its 
cohesion funding cut. However, the situation 
would be reversed if the Member States’ 
problems deteriorate to a point where it 
requires EU emergency financial assistance. 
Then, the Member State would be able to use 
cohesion funds more easily. The two hardly 
seem compatible19. The envisaged rules 
would result in an indirect incentive for 
troubled Member States to request 
emergency financial assistance, so as to 
access cohesion funds more easily. The rules 
also disregard the difficulties of other 
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financially troubled Member States in finding 
the means to co-finance cohesion policy 
projects. 
5. An alternative approach 
Given the aforementioned shortcomings, it 
seems that the idea of linking cohesion policy 
to economic governance is far from perfect. 
Several Member States nevertheless favour 
making EU expenditure more conditional on 
Member States’ economic and fiscal 
performances. Therefore, the idea is not 
likely to be abandoned. It is in all parties’ 
interests to address the shortcomings of the 
Commission’s plans as much as possible. 
Unfortunately, linking cohesion policy to 
economic governance creates problems 
which prove difficult to overcome. In theory, 
the improper targeting of regions could be 
addressed by requiring a Member State to 
replace the EU’s cohesion funding by 
national funding. Yet, this would only 
exacerbate the country’s difficulties. The 
counterproductive nature of the sanctions for 
its part seems unavoidable, as is the case for 
any financial sanction. Gradual sanctioning 
can only partly overcome this problem. Non-
financial sanctions could provide a solution, 
but there is no agreement on this matter 
among the Member States20. 
Nevertheless, other problems mentioned in 
this paper can be addressed by adopting an 
alternative approach. This approach would be 
different from the current proposal in two 
respects. 
First of all, the current focus on the fiscal 
side of economic governance is erroneous.  It 
wrongly signals that macro-economic rules 
are less important than fiscal ones. Cohesion 
funding should be made conditional in a 
similar manner to both the fiscal and the 
macro-economic side of economic 
governance. In both domains, a gradual 
approach is feasible21. 
In addition, the EU should avoid 
inconsistencies in the rules applicable to 
Member States that receive EU emergency 
financial assistance and other troubled 
Member States. Instead, a carrot-and-stick 
approach can be adopted for all countries 
that have a fiscal or macro-economic 
derailing. Cohesion funding would then be 
dependent on the Member States’ willingness 
to tackle its problems. If a Member State 
commits to undertake the proper reforms -
and carries them out-, co-financing 
requirements can be eased. Such easier access 
to cohesion funds would demonstrate the 
EU’s confidence in the country’s policies and 
would facilitate the return to normality. If, on 
the contrary, the Member State does not 
undertake the actions required by the EU, its 
cohesion funding can be cut. This signals the 
lack of confidence in the Member State’s 
strategy for exiting its difficulties. It would 
also avoid the unproductive use of cohesion 
funds. 
Conclusion 
Linking cohesion policy to European 
economic governance has the potential to 
strengthen both. It can be an additional way 
to strive towards compliance with the 
economic governance rules, while sound 
fiscal and macro-economic policies can 
increase the effectiveness of cohesion policy.  
Despite these advantages, the linkage 
envisaged by the Commission contains 
several shortcomings. Some of them seem 
hard to overcome, as they are more or less 
unavoidable when linking cohesion policy 
and economic governance. An alternative 
approach could however deal with two 
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crucial problems, namely a) the inconsistency 
between the rules for Member States that 
receive EU emergency financial assistance 
and the rules for other troubled Member 
States, and b) the neglect of macro-economic 
governance rules. 
Under the alternative approach proposed in 
this paper, cohesion policy would be linked 
in a similar manner to both the fiscal and 
macro-economic dimensions of economic 
governance. Furthermore, a carrot-and-stick 
approach would be introduced for countries 
that face a fiscal or macro-economic 
derailing. These countries’ access to cohesion 
funding would be made dependent on the 
actions they undertake to resolve their 
difficulties. The suggested approach 
highlights the cohesion policy’s role as an 
instrument for EU solidarity and would 
contribute to a better-functioning EU and 
eurozone  which is to the benefit of all 
Member States. 
 
Stijn Verhelst is Research Fellow at Egmont 
 Royal Institute for International Relations. 
                                                 
Endnotes 
1 As part of the economic governance reform, 
deposits and fines can be required for eurozone 
countries that face a fiscal or macro-economic 
slippage. 
2 The Finance Ministers supported the idea in the 
Van Rompuy Task Force Report, see: Report of 
the Task Force on Economic Governance, 21 
October 2010, p. 10. For the European Central 
Bank, see: ECB, Reinforcing Economic 
Governance in the Euro Area, 10 June 2010, p.7 
3 Letter of President Sarkozy and Chancellor 
Merkel, 17 August 2011, retrievable on: 
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/__Anlag
en/2011-08-17-dt-franz-brief-
eng,property=publicationFile.pdf 
                                                                        
4 This is the annual amount spend during the 
period 2007-2013 (at 2011 prices). 
5 Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, hereinafter TFEU. Besides 
reducing disparities, the cohesion policy also aims 
at increasing the competiveness of the entire EU. 
Consequently, it finances projects in all the EU’s 
regions. 
6 These two Structural Funds are the European 
Fund for Regional Development (ERDF) and the 
European Social Fund (ESF). 
7 Article 126(8) TFEU. 
8-Article 4 Council Regulation (EC) No 
1084/2006 of 11 July 2006. 
9 In January 2010, the Council concluded that 
Greece had not taken sufficient actions to undo 
its excessive deficit. See: Council Decision 
2010/291/EU of 19 January 2010. 
10 The legislative proposals are expected by the 
end of September 2011. For the main 
Commission publications on the subject, see 
‘further reading’. 
11 European Commission, A Budget for Europe 
2020. Part I, COM(2011) 500, 29 June 2011, pp. 
12-13. 
12 Eurozone assistance is provided by the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) and the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF). Both are to be replaced mid-2013 
by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
The ESM will be based on Article 136 TFEU (the 
specific paragraph is to be ratified by 2013). The 
assistance to non-eurozone countries is provided 
by the EU’s Balance of Payments Assistance, see 
Article 143 TFEU. 
13 European Commission, Increasing Co-
financing Rates for EU Funds - Boosting 
European Economic Recovery, Press Release, 
IP/11/942, 1 August 2011. 
14 The Commission has also proposed to link 
economic governance with the agriculture and 
fishery funds. While many of the considerations 
are similar to those for cohesion policy, these 
proposals fall outside the scope of this Brief. 
15 Under the current rules, the Council decides by 
qualified majority whether or not to apply a 
sanction proposed by the Commission. In 
contrast, the reversed qualified majority voting 
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
7 
 
The European Policy Brief is a publication of Egmont, 
the Royal Institute for International Relations
EGMONT 
Royal Institute for International Relations 
Naamsestraat 69 
1000 Brussels 
BELGIUM 
  
> www.egmontinstitute.be 
The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the 
authors and are not those of EGMONT, Royal Institute for 
International Relations 
                                                                        
procedure would imply that a sanction proposed 
by the Commission is automatically adopted, 
unless the Council opposes it by a qualified 
majority within a limited timeframe. 
16 European Commission, Results of the public 
consultation on the conclusions of the fifth 
report on economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, SEC (2011) 590 final, 13 May 2011. 
Dirk Ahner, Director-General of the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional 
Policy, also raised concerns, see: Conference of 
Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe, Azores, 
Press Release, 6 June 2011, retrievable on: 
www.crpm.org/pub/presse/185_communiqu_bp
_aores_en.pdf 
17 This argument is less relevant for the Cohesion 
Fund, as the Fund is allocated to the Member 
States. Yet, the Cohesion Fund represents only 
20% of the EU’s cohesion expenditure. 
Furthermore, the pertinence of the argument 
depends largely on the degree of autonomy of the 
regions, which differs considerably between the 
Member States. 
18 However, as a counterargument, most of the 
richer Member States are part of the eurozone 
and can therefore be sanctioned in other ways. 
19 This is of course different for countries that 
have already received financial assistance by the 
EU. 
20 France and Germany have suggested the 
suspension of voting rights, but no consensus 
was found on the matter. See: Franco-German 
Declaration, Deauville, 18 October 2010, 
retrievable_on: 
www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank_objects/Fra
nco-german_declaration.pdf 
21 For instance, a partial suspension of cohesion 
policy funding could be considered when a 
Member State does not take sufficient actions to 
meet its medium-term budgetary objective (see 
Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1466/97, OJ L 209, 
2 August 1997, pp. 1–5). The same can be done 
when the Member State does not take sufficient 
actions to undo its imbalances in the preventive 
stage of the macro-economic surveillance 
procedure (see Article 6 of COM (2010) 527, 29 
September 2010). More thorough sanctions or 
more flexibility can be envisaged when a Member 
State is under an Excessive Deficit or Imbalance 
Procedure. 
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